Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013484zk346
Title: | THE NOTORIOUS PRG:FORMAL VERIFICATION OF THE HMAC-DRBG PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR |
Authors: | Ye, Katherine |
Advisors: | Appel, Andrew |
Contributors: | Green, Matthew |
Department: | Computer Science |
Class Year: | 2016 |
Abstract: | We have proved, with machine-checked proofs, that the output produced by HMAC-DRBG is indistinguishable from random by a computationally bounded adversary. We proved this about a high-level specification of a simplified version of HMAC-DRBG written in the probabilistic language provided by the Foundational Cryptography Framework (FCF), which is embedded in the Coq proof assistant. We have also proven on paper that HMAC-DRBG is backtrackingresistant. Our work comprises the first formal verification of a real-world PRG. Our functional specification can be then linked to a proof of functional correctness of mbedTLS’s C implementation of HMAC-DRBG, allowing our proofs of cryptographic security properties to transfer to this implementation. Thus, this will create the first fully verified real-world DRBG. |
Extent: | 73 pages |
URI: | http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013484zk346 |
Type of Material: | Princeton University Senior Theses |
Language: | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Computer Science, 1988-2020 |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|
Ye_Katherine_thesis.pdf | 489.62 kB | Adobe PDF | Request a copy |
Items in Dataspace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.