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http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013484zk346
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor | Green, Matthew | - |
dc.contributor.advisor | Appel, Andrew | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ye, Katherine | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-06-22T14:45:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2016-06-22T14:45:48Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2016-04-29 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016-06-22 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013484zk346 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We have proved, with machine-checked proofs, that the output produced by HMAC-DRBG is indistinguishable from random by a computationally bounded adversary. We proved this about a high-level specification of a simplified version of HMAC-DRBG written in the probabilistic language provided by the Foundational Cryptography Framework (FCF), which is embedded in the Coq proof assistant. We have also proven on paper that HMAC-DRBG is backtrackingresistant. Our work comprises the first formal verification of a real-world PRG. Our functional specification can be then linked to a proof of functional correctness of mbedTLS’s C implementation of HMAC-DRBG, allowing our proofs of cryptographic security properties to transfer to this implementation. Thus, this will create the first fully verified real-world DRBG. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 73 pages | * |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.title | THE NOTORIOUS PRG:FORMAL VERIFICATION OF THE HMAC-DRBG PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR | en_US |
dc.type | Princeton University Senior Theses | - |
pu.date.classyear | 2016 | en_US |
pu.department | Computer Science | en_US |
pu.pdf.coverpage | SeniorThesisCoverPage | - |
Appears in Collections: | Computer Science, 1988-2020 |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
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Ye_Katherine_thesis.pdf | 489.62 kB | Adobe PDF | Request a copy |
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