Understanding Meritocracy: A Study of Higher Education Institutions in India

Abstract

State effectiveness in the developing world is oftentimes categorized in broad brush strokes: states are described as everything from patrimonial and weak to developmental and legal-rational. But such broad categorizations neglect the variations in effectiveness that can often be observed within a state. This is especially true for a developing state such as India, where certain government agencies are known to be effective even as many others are widely recognized as ineffective. Why are some agencies effective? I argue that the presence of meritocracy is a key ingredient for explaining variations in effectiveness. Defined as a system of hiring and promotion based upon demonstrated ability and expected performance, meritocracy itself is composed of two political components: the ability for an agency to make its own decisions internally (i.e. autonomy) and an organizational culture that ensures individual-level commitment to meritocratic practices (i.e. accountability). The purpose of this study is to identify how these components come about and the ways in which they must come together to engender meritocracy, with the ultimate goal of explaining why certain agencies can be effective in an environment when so many similar agencies are not. I demonstrate my arguments through an empirical examination of government-run higher education institutions in India.