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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.advisor | Scheppele, Kim L | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Hassani, Sara Nephew | en_US |
dc.contributor.other | Sociology Department | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-05-08T13:42:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-05-08T05:08:11Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01z316q166p | - |
dc.description.abstract | Existing surveys demonstrate that in the United States, most homeowners believe that their home insurance coverage will cover the complete costs to rebuild their home in the event of a total loss. Yet, most dwellings are insured for an amount that is less than what would be required to rebuild -- a condition called "underinsurance." By conducting historical research on the United States home insurance market, I show that insurers have recognized underinsurance as a problem afflicting the home insurance market in every decade since the Depression. Insurers have repeatedly attempted, and failed, to resolve inadequate insurance-to-value -- through salesmanship, innovations in valuation methodologies, and automation. This result complicates theories of inadequate insurance, drawn from insurance economics, that explain inadequate insurance as primarily a problem of demand. A longstanding supply-side problem of accurate property valuation has contributed substantially to widespread, persistent underinsurance. Using fieldwork conducted after the 2003 and 2007 San Diego wildfires, I show how pre-loss policyholder experiences supported their expectations that their home insurance would be sufficient: analogical reasoning from small losses to large losses; interactions with insurance agents; and legal consciousness of the insurance contract. This case demonstrates how the presence of information asymmetry in a market can accompany "false certainty" of transaction outcomes -- not just perceived uncertainty of transaction outcomes -- among low-information parties to transaction. Market features that are often credited with reducing uncertainty need not always equip market actors with better knowledge; these conditions can elide potentially variable transaction outcomes, consequently contributing to widespread market misconceptions. In contrast with most existing disaster recovery studies, I find that even households with reputable insurers struggle with insurance after disaster. Policyholder efforts to overcome inadequate insurance did not only consist of taking out loans or using savings; rather, individuals actively attempted to minimize the size of their home insurance gaps through actions intended to increase insurance payouts or decrease rebuilding costs. For insured households, gap-minimizing strategies -- which I identify as negotiating, barn raising, and downsizing -- constituted much of the disaster recovery process. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Princeton, NJ : Princeton University | en_US |
dc.relation.isformatof | The Mudd Manuscript Library retains one bound copy of each dissertation. Search for these copies in the <a href=http://catalog.princeton.edu> library's main catalog </a> | en_US |
dc.subject | disaster | en_US |
dc.subject | fire | en_US |
dc.subject | home | en_US |
dc.subject | information asymmetry | en_US |
dc.subject | insurance | en_US |
dc.subject | recovery | en_US |
dc.subject.classification | Sociology | en_US |
dc.title | Magnifying Disaster: The Causes and Consequences of Home Underinsurance | en_US |
dc.type | Academic dissertations (Ph.D.) | en_US |
pu.projectgrantnumber | 690-2143 | en_US |
pu.embargo.terms | 2017-05-08 | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Sociology |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Hassani_princeton_0181D_10530.pdf | 780.5 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Download |
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