Process is Power: Improving the Political Mechanics of International Agreement Implementation in the United States

Abstract

The United States federal government enters into hundreds of international agreements every year, most of which the president implements without congressional review. The use of vehicles which require a vote in Congress for approval, such as treaties, has declined as a percentage of all international pacts. Though this trend stretches far into the past, the sharpest reduction in congressional review came between the end of the Second World War and the present. This paper seeks to understand why only a select few agreements now receive congressional review and whether the legislature resisted or approved of that change. The literature offers four major explanations for this trend. This investigation adds to existing scholarship by focusing on lessons from agreements with congressional involvement, rather than those implemented by the president alone. In addition, it works to determine any politically feasible policy shifts that could improve the international agreement implementation system.

To carry out this investigation, the paper examines the implementation of two agreements: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015) limiting Iranian nuclear proliferation, as well as the North American Free Trade Agreement (1994) establishing open trade between the United States and its neighbors. From these cases, the thesis determines that Congress wants a role on major international agreements and can use its power to secure one. The president may even seek out congressional involvement if he requires legislators’ constitutional powers to properly implement a deal’s provisions. Additionally, each deal’s specific attributes contribute to how Congress and the president deal with implementation. Congress shows more interest in deals covering certain policy areas, and a deal’s political context can contribute to friendlier or more hostile inter-branch relations. On policy changes, this thesis recommends a permanent congressional review process for international agreements, more interaction between Congress and the president during deal negotiations, and better congressional caucuses on international issues.