The Dispositional Self: A Response to Buddhist Arguments for the Nonexistence of the Self

Abstract

The objective of my thesis is to explore the Buddhist arguments for the nonexistence of the self, referred to as “no-self,” and propose possible counterarguments. I do not aim to fully reject no-self, but instead strive to show that some part of a person could be reasonably considered a self. I will begin by discussing the fundamental Buddhist principles of karma, death and rebirth. Next, I will outline the Buddhist theory that persons are really just a collection of parts known as the five aggregates. Then, I will summarize three arguments for no-self: the argument from impermanence, the argument from control, and the argument from perception-and-inference. I then suggest two initial counterarguments to no-self. First, I propose a self-like entity that connects sequential lifetimes in the karmic cycle of death and rebirth. Second, I argue the self could be an agent that chooses goals and ensures their attainment. Following these ultimately unsuccessful arguments, I introduce Susan Wolf’s “real self” to compare a contemporary philosophical theory of a self to the Buddhist arguments. The real self proves valuable in helping me formulate my primary counter to no-self, the dispositional self. I finally propose the existence of the dispositional self, an enduring entity that manifests itself consistently in different situations. It can best be understood as a complex of a unique set of values and predilections. Its make-up is determined by one’s genes which are created during fertilization, and as such I posit the particular values and predilections of the dispositional self remain constant from birth until death. The best evidence for my view is seen in the case of identical twins and triplets separated at birth. I compare the dispositional self to the three aforementioned Buddhist arguments for no-self and argue that the dispositional self is a reasonable candidate for self-hood. I end the paper by offering four counterarguments to the dispositional self.