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http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01p2676z57fFull metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | Elga, Adam | |
| dc.contributor.author | Shteingart, Jacob | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-30T22:04:22Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-09-30T22:04:22Z | - |
| dc.date.created | 2020-05-19 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-09-30 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01p2676z57f | - |
| dc.description.abstract | I evaluate a case of an individual with diminished cognitive capacities. I make the specific claim that proxies are permissible for the creation and updating of wills. I also establish a general framework for the evaluation of desires and interests. Then, I use a framework of ideal agency to argue that, if they adequately fulfill the individual’s agential capacities, proxies are permissible and should be used. This has widespread implications, especially with the rise of AI. | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | A Proxy for the Future: Desires, Interests, and Increased Power for Proxies | |
| dc.type | Princeton University Senior Theses | |
| pu.date.classyear | 2020 | |
| pu.department | Philosophy | |
| pu.pdf.coverpage | SeniorThesisCoverPage | |
| pu.contributor.authorid | 961169049 | |
| Appears in Collections: | Philosophy, 1924-2020 | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SHTEINGART-JACOB-THESIS.pdf | 295.91 kB | Adobe PDF | Request a copy |
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