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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01j96020650
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dc.contributor.advisorLieberman, Evan Sen_US
dc.contributor.authorMcClendon, Gwyneth H.en_US
dc.contributor.otherPolitics Departmenten_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-15T23:55:14Z-
dc.date.available2016-11-15T06:10:55Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01j96020650-
dc.description.abstractImplicitly or explicitly, research on democratic politics often assumes that citizens seek primarily to maximize their material wealth or power. By contrast, drawing on insights from social psychology and behavioral economics, this dissertation argues that individuals also care deeply about their relative positions within groups, particularly vis-a-vis neighbors and co-ethnics. High within-group status is pleasurable in itself, and under certain circumstance citizens pursue it at the expense of their material interests. The innovation of the dissertation is to highlight the importance of within-group status concerns (envy, spite, the desire for esteem) for understanding real-world political behavior. The core of the dissertation uses within-group status concerns to address three important puzzles. First, I ask why democracies sometimes fail to meet the needs of their citizens. Specifically, I look at instances of Pareto-improving policies that, despite promising to make no one materially worse off, often go unimplemented. I show that citizens' concerns for within-group status give rise to public opposition to such policies when, though Pareto-improving, the policies make some citizens better off than others. Second, I consider puzzles about preferences over government redistribution. Why, despite conventional wisdom, do citizens sometimes vote for redistribution schemes that would make them materially worse off? I show that citizens do so when policies promise them status benefits instead. Finally, I explore the classic collective action dilemma. When and why do ordinary citizens choose to participate in protests and other forms of political collective action given that they could reap the benefits and bear none of the costs if they abstain? I show that the promise of higher within-group status can act as a powerful selective incentive for citizens to participate. In testing these arguments, I employ methods ranging from interviews and archival document review to large-n statistical analyses to field experiments. I concentrate the empirical analyses in two democracies: South Africa and the United States. I do so because these two countries provide tough places for the theory to hold while also demonstrating that the theory can hold in different contexts. The final chapter considers the scope of the findings and offers suggestions for extensions.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherPrinceton, NJ : Princeton Universityen_US
dc.relation.isformatofThe Mudd Manuscript Library retains one bound copy of each dissertation. Search for these copies in the <a href=http://catalog.princeton.edu> library's main catalog </a>en_US
dc.subjectenvyen_US
dc.subjectparticipationen_US
dc.subjectpolitical behavioren_US
dc.subjectSouth Africaen_US
dc.subjectstatusen_US
dc.subjectUnited Statesen_US
dc.subject.classificationPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.titleThe Politics of Envy and Esteem in Two Democraciesen_US
dc.typeAcademic dissertations (Ph.D.)en_US
pu.projectgrantnumber690-2143en_US
pu.embargo.terms2016-11-15en_US
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