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Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.advisor | Smith, Michael | - |
dc.contributor.author | Jubas, Benjamin | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-07-17T14:55:24Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-07-17T14:55:24Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2014-03-31 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2014-07-17 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01fn106z12c | - |
dc.description.abstract | In his book Being Realistic About Reasons, T.M. Scanlon argues for a form of normative realism known as “reasons fundamentalism.” I attack the integrity of the domain-dependent metaphysics he adopts to support this view, and argue that a sufficiently sophisticated form of expressivism might be preferable to reasons fundamentalism. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 62 | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.title | The Dogma of Reasons Fundamentalism A Critique of Thomas M. Scanlon’s Metaethics | en_US |
dc.type | Princeton University Senior Theses | - |
pu.date.classyear | 2014 | en_US |
pu.department | Philosophy | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Philosophy, 1924-2020 |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
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JubasBenST14.pdf | 259.69 kB | Adobe PDF | Request a copy |
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