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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01fn106z12c
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dc.contributor.advisorSmith, Michael-
dc.contributor.authorJubas, Benjamin-
dc.date.accessioned2014-07-17T14:55:24Z-
dc.date.available2014-07-17T14:55:24Z-
dc.date.created2014-03-31-
dc.date.issued2014-07-17-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01fn106z12c-
dc.description.abstractIn his book Being Realistic About Reasons, T.M. Scanlon argues for a form of normative realism known as “reasons fundamentalism.” I attack the integrity of the domain-dependent metaphysics he adopts to support this view, and argue that a sufficiently sophisticated form of expressivism might be preferable to reasons fundamentalism.en_US
dc.format.extent62en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleThe Dogma of Reasons Fundamentalism A Critique of Thomas M. Scanlon’s Metaethicsen_US
dc.typePrinceton University Senior Theses-
pu.date.classyear2014en_US
pu.departmentPhilosophyen_US
Appears in Collections:Philosophy, 1924-2020

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