Defining "Reasonable Accommodation": Reframing the Americans with Disabilities Act through the Disability Human Rights Lens

Abstract

This thesis sets out to answer the question, what should reasonable accommodation entail under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990? I argue that as it stands, the ADA’s “reasonable accommodation” standard is ambiguous and so fails both at guiding employers effectively and at securing morally desirable accommodations for employees. I evaluate definitions of “reasonable” that have already been proposed: the fairness and equalizing principles, societal perception as a scale of reasonableness, estimated dollar cost of accommodation compared to job productivity, and judge-made cost-benefit analysis. I find faults in each of these definitions and propose my own. To do so, I look to potential moral frameworks of the Act: under the social model of disability, as civil rights legislation, as a welfare reform document, and under the capabilities approach. Ultimately, I contend that the disability human rights view maintains the benefits of all of these frameworks while eliminating their shortcomings. The view upholds a commitment to the social model of disability while simultaneously recognizing the importance of individual medical characteristics. It supports human, civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. It recognizes the importance of individuals beyond their economic impact, enabling everyone – regardless of ability – to flourish and achieve a life worthy of human dignity.

Using the human right to dignity as a universal moral commitment, I justify the human rights to employment, autonomy, cultural participation, and participation in leisure. With an agreed upon starting point of these existing human rights for all individuals – regardless of apparent ability – I evaluate three hypothetical scenarios: the Bob, Bill, and Jody problems. In assessing characteristics of these scenarios that may determine reasonableness, I conclude that factors are only relevant insofar as they impact – positively or negatively – the realization of an individual’s human rights. Under the assumptions that an individual with a disability (1) is qualified to perform her job after she is accommodated and (2) finds value in her employment or artistic situation, I determine that an accommodation should be considered reasonable if it allows the realization of human rights for one individual without limiting those of anyone else. This holds true in both employment and artistic/cultural scenarios.

With regard to implementation, I recognize that a simple reframing of the ADA through the disability human rights lens could be achieved with institutional reforms comparable to those already in place elsewhere. The most notable adjustment would be creating a United States Human Rights Commission that could oversee violations of this new conception of reasonableness, a reform that has demonstrated feasibility by similar commissions in other nations. Ultimately, I argue that the recommendations of this thesis have implications beyond the particular problems discussed herein. Rather than applying only to the definition of reasonableness for employment and artistic/cultural scenarios, the disability human rights view should govern other life aspects of individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities in order to truly achieve human dignity for all.