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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01cz30pw11f
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dc.contributorHogan, Desmond-
dc.contributor.advisorNehamas, Alexander-
dc.contributor.authorCooke, Philip-
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-20T12:56:58Z-
dc.date.available2016-07-20T12:56:58Z-
dc.date.created2016-03-31-
dc.date.issued2016-07-20-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01cz30pw11f-
dc.description.abstractNietzsche thought a great deal about our relationship to truth. Some interpreters have argued that Nietzsche maintained the ‘falsification thesis,’ which claims that all of our beliefs are (in some sense or another) false. This thesis attempts to exonerate him from that radical view and provide an alternative picture of his ideas about truth and falsification.en_US
dc.format.extent59 pages*
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleNIETZSCHE ON FALSIFICATIONen_US
dc.typePrinceton University Senior Theses-
pu.date.classyear2016en_US
pu.departmentPhilosophyen_US
pu.pdf.coverpageSeniorThesisCoverPage-
Appears in Collections:Philosophy, 1924-2020

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