Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp016969z087dFull metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | McGrath, Sarah | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Frost, Evan | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-07-15T15:15:56Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-07-15T15:15:56Z | - |
| dc.date.created | 2013-04-01 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-07-15 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp016969z087d | - |
| dc.description.abstract | James Lenman objects to consequentialism’s usefulness as a decision procedure, claiming that knowable consequences make up too small a portion of total consequences to provide meaningfully large reasons for action. I respond that when we properly think about the consequentialist decision procedure, the reasons knowable consequences provide are decisive. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 39 pages | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.title | A Defense of Consequentialism Against James Lenman’s Epistemic Objection | en_US |
| dc.type | Princeton University Senior Theses | - |
| pu.date.classyear | 2013 | en_US |
| pu.department | Philosophy | en_US |
| pu.pdf.coverpage | SeniorThesisCoverPage | - |
| dc.rights.accessRights | Walk-in Access. This thesis can only be viewed on computer terminals at the <a href=http://mudd.princeton.edu>Mudd Manuscript Library</a>. | - |
| pu.mudd.walkin | yes | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Philosophy, 1924-2020 | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|
| FrostEvanThesis.pdf | 261.34 kB | Adobe PDF | Request a copy |
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