The Politics of Regime Complexes: Power, Deference, and Cooperation

Abstract

Since the end of World War II, states have constructed international institutions at a breakneck pace. As a result, dense clusters of institutions now compete for authority in many issue areas. This dissertation examines the causes and consequences of institutional proliferation. It argues that states create and leverage networks of institutions to advance political goals. In doing so, they confront a tension between increasing control over global governance and reducing the effectiveness of cooperation.

The dissertation contains three articles. In ``Angling for Influence: Institutional Proliferation in Development Banking,'' I argue that concerns about bargaining power lead states to build overlapping institutions. I test this argument by analyzing how the distribution of vote shares in the World Bank drives the creation of new development banks. Drawing on archival research into the Bank's historical allocation of votes, I leverage a natural experiment stemming from an early change in the vote share formula. The results reveal that power misalignment has a strong causal effect on institutional proliferation.

The second article, ``Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes,'' demonstrates how international organizations (IOs) coordinate to reduce conflict and divide labor. I describe patterns of institutional deference---defined as the acceptance of another IO's exercise of authority ---in the counterterrorism, intellectual property, and election-monitoring regime complexes. I find that IOs that defer to each subsequently divide labor by focusing their efforts on separate subissues. I also show that deference is a strategic act that is shaped both by efficiency concerns and power politics.

The final article, ``Race to the Bottom? Vertically Differentiated Institutions and Regime Complexity,'' analyzes how overlapping IOs affect international cooperation. I argue that they have contrasting effects depending on the level of differentiation among institutions. When states view institutions as substitutes, the ability to forum shop will reduce the total policy adjustment achieved in the regime. However, when institutions are vertically differentiated---i.e., the depth of an institution's rules affect the benefits of compliance---a regime complex can increase policy adjustment. I demonstrate these dynamics formally and provide empirical evidence in analyses of the development finance and election-monitoring regime complexes.