Delegitimizing The Ottoman Imperial Order At The Threshold of New Diplomacy

Abstract

This dissertation examines the interplay between the policies of the United States and Britain vis-à-vis the Ottoman Armenians from the Great War through the Lausanne Peace Conference. It starts with a review of historical background of their policies prior to the war. Then, it looks into the development of different political aspects of the issue of Ottoman Armenians in view of the British war aims as well as America's neutral status in the war. With American entry into the war in April 1917, the thesis concentrates on the impact of British efforts to induce America to get involved in the Near Eastern conflict, and continues its focus on the Anglo-American interaction at the Paris Peace Conference. The thesis discusses the emergence of the mandatory system and the American efforts for a mandate in the Ottoman geography in the light of tension between the notions of new diplomacy vs. old diplomacy. It concludes with an analysis of the political circumstances that culminated in the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty.

Whereas America was practically a nonexistent political player in the pre-war period, its involvement in the Ottoman geopolitical space underwent a dramatic transformation toward the latter part of the war and during the postwar peace negotiations. Under the impetus of Wilson's policy of interventionism, America emerged as one of the key players in the Ottoman settlement. Britain did its utmost to convert America's rising power in world affairs to suit its own foreign policy goal of safeguarding its imperial interests in the former Ottoman lands. This dissertation posits that via the prism of Anglo-American policies on the Ottoman Armenians, it is possible to trace the major dynamics and factors which led to the undermining of the legitimacy of Ottoman imperial order in the post-war Near East at the threshold of Wilson's new diplomacy.