Values, Reasons, & Ought

Abstract

This dissertation presents a systematic account of the explanatory relations between

our most basic evaluative and normative notions: values, reasons, and ought. I defend

three central theses. The first thesis, the value-based theory of reasons, maintains

that for some fact to be a reason for you to X is for that fact to constitute or explain

the fact that your X-ing would realise some state of affairs that is valuable. The fact

that giving flowers to Alfred will make him happy is a reason to do so, since his

happiness is valuable. The second thesis concerns the weight of reasons. The

weight of any reason is an increasing function of the amount of value likely to be

realised, and the value of your having a pro-attitude towards that value. In this case

the value of the pro-attitude will be explained by the nature of your relationship

with Alfred. Importantly, while values are neutral, weighted reasons are always

relative. The positive account vindicates deontological intuitions about partiality,

integrity, and commitment, and virtue-theoretic intuitions about the value and

normative significance of attitudes and the live well-lived. The third thesis, the

reasons-based theory of ought, maintains that for some X to be what you ought to

do, all things considered, is for the net weight of the reasons in favour of X to be

greater than the net weight of the reasons in favour of any alternative to X. So if

your reasons to give flowers to Alfred are weightier than your reasons to go apple-

picking with Mildred, and weightier than your reasons to do anything else, then you

ought to give flowers to Alfred.